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IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES?  A 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AS TO 
WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD 
FOLLOW CANADA’S LEAD AND ALLOW 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE   
 
INTRODUCTION 
n June 2003, the Ontario Court of Appeals handed down 
the landmark decision of Halpern v. Toronto, which sanc-
tioned same-sex marriage.1  A mere two months after the deci-
sion, nearly 600 same-sex couples had applied for marriage li-
censes in Toronto’s city hall.2  More than one hundred of these 
couples were U.S citizens, who had traveled to Canada to le-
gally marry.3  Not only did the Halpern court rule that the Ca-
nadian federal law limiting marriage to heterosexual couples 
violated the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, part of the 
Canadian Constitution,4  but the court also changed Canada’s 
legal definition of marriage to encompass same-sex unions.5  
Prior to Canada’s allowance of same-sex marriage it had been 
  
 1. Halpern v. Toronto, [2003] 65 O.R.3d 161. 
 2. Clifford Krauss, Now Free to Marry, Canada’s Gays Say, ‘Do I?’, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2003, at A1.   
 3. Id.  Canada has no residency or citizenship requirement for marriage; 
therefore, U.S. citizens can obtain a marriage license and legally marry their 
same-sex or opposite-sex partner.  Deborah Gutierrez, Gay Marriage in Can-
ada: Strategies of the Gay Liberation Movement and the Implications it Will 
Have on the United States, 10 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 175, 208 (2004).  
Five weeks after Halpern, 15% of the 362 same-sex marriage licenses issued 
in Canada were issued to U.S. couples.  Jay Weiser, The Next Normal Devel-
opments Since Marriage Rights for Same-Sex Couples in New York, 13 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 48, 50 (2004).   
 4. CAN CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms).  Jeffery Hodgson & Randall Palmer, Toronto Issues Gay Mar-
riage License After Ruling, REUTERS, June 10, 2003, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/printerFriendlyPopup.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=
2907895. 
 5. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 196–97.  
I 
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legal in the Netherlands since April 2001, in Switzerland since 
September 2002, and in Belgium since early 2003.6   
In stark contrast to the recent developments in Canada and 
Western Europe, the United States lags far behind in recogniz-
ing the right of homosexuals to marry.7  The reason why the 
U.S. couples had to cross the border to marry is that only one of 
the fifty states permits same-sex couples to legally marry.8  
While Senators in the United States are working to amend the 
Constitution to say that marriage can only be between one man 
  
 6. Developments in the Law: II.  Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths 
Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and 
Europe, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2004 (2003); Weiser, supra note 3, at 50. 
 7. Steve Sanders, U.S. Lags on Gay Rights; Supreme Court Can Help, 
CHI. TRIB., June 22, 2003, at C3.   
 8. See generally Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 
(Mass. 2003) (holding that the prohibition on same-sex marriage violated 
Massachusetts’ constitution).  See also Massachusetts Court Rules Ban on Gay 
Marriage Unconstitutional, available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/11/18/ 
samesex.marriage.ruling/.    
Six months after gay and lesbian couples began legally marrying in 
Massachusetts, opponents of same-sex marriage swept Election Day, 
with voters in eleven states approving constitutional amendments 
codifying marriage as an exclusively heterosexual institution.  The 
amendments won in Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Utah and even Ore-
gon – the one state where gay rights activists had hoped to prevail.   
The amendments passed with a 3-to-1 margin in Kentucky, Georgia 
and Arkansas, 3-to-2 in Ohio and 6-to-1 in Mississippi. Bans passed 
by narrower margins in Oregon, about 57%, and Michigan, about 
59%. 
Kavan Peterson, 50-State Rundown On Gay Marriage Laws, Nov. 3, 2004, 
available at http://www.stateline.org/stateline/?pa=story&sa=showStoryInfo& 
id=353058&columns=false. 
Since Massachusetts began allowing gay and lesbian couples to wed 
last May, 13 states have approved constitutional bans on same-sex 
marriage. This number includes Missouri, which approved such a 
measure in August.  The amendments in Mississippi, Montana and 
Oregon refer only to marriage, specifying that it should be limited to 
unions of one man and one woman. The measures in Arkansas, Geor-
gia, Kentucky, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma and Utah 
call for a ban on civil unions or other partnership benefits as well. … 
Since the Massachusetts ruling, more than 35 states have introduced 
legislation aimed at preserving the traditional definition of marriage 
as a union between a man and a woman.  
Id.  
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and one woman,9 the Canadian courts are ruling that the same 
declaration in their country is unconstitutional.10   Furthermore, 
in 1996, the U.S. federal government enacted the Defense Of 
Marriage Act (DOMA),11 which established that no state has an 
obligation to recognize a same-sex union performed in another 
state.12  DOMA also codified the federal definition of marriage 
as the union of one man and one woman.13   In addition to the 
  
 9. Helen Dewar & Alan Cooperman, Gay Marriage Ban Headed for Sen-
ate Defeat; GOP May Salvage Rural Voters' Goodwill Out of Failure to Amend 
Constitution, WASH. POST, July 14, 2004, at A2.  
 10. Janice Tibbetts, MPS Want Quick Vote on Same-Sex Marriage, THE 
OTTAWA CITIZEN, Sept. 10, 2003, available at http://canada.com/national/ 
story.asp?id=887A9FC7-D85D-4BC0-A8D2-E199736A900D.  Courts in three 
provinces – Toronto, British Columbia, and Quebec – have said that the fed-
eral ban on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional and currently Toronto and 
British Columbia permit same-sex marriages. All other provinces are waiting 
for federal legislation to pass before allowing same-sex unions. Id.  
 11. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738(C) (2005), which provides that  
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian 
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judi-
cial proceeding of any other State, territory, or tribe respecting a re-
lationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a mar-
riage under the laws of such other State, territory, or tribe, or a right 
or claim arising from such relationship.  
Id.  
  The federal government’s DOMA is not an outright ban on same-sex 
marriage, but it does allow the federal and state governments to refuse to 
recognize same-sex unions.   Maria Hinojosa, Massachusetts Court to Rule on 
Same-Sex Marriages, Jan. 13, 2004, available at http:www.cnn.com/2003/LAW 
/07/14/same.sex.marriages/. 
 12. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738(C). 
 13. 1 U.S.C.S. § 7 (2005), which provides that: 
[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus 
and agencies or the United States, the word “marriage” means only a 
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, 
and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who 
is a husband or wife.  
Id.  
See also Elizabeth Kristen, Recent Developments: The Struggle for Same-Sex 
Marriage Continues, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 104, 113 (1999).  
With the enactment of DOMA, Congress for the first time limited 
States’ obligation to give full faith and credit to ‘public acts, records 
and judicial proceedings’ of other states.  Some commentators have 
argued that DOMA is unconstitutional since it exceeds Congress’s 
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federal DOMA, thirty-nine states have enacted “junior DO-
MAs”, which essentially provide for the same rules as their fed-
eral counterpart.14    
While the Canadian government did not pass a specific mar-
riage law establishing the rights of gay and lesbian couples to 
marry, the court, of its own accord, determined that prohibiting 
same-sex unions was in violation of the Canadian Constitu-
tion.15  If changes regarding same-sex marriage are to be made 
in the United States, they will likely follow a similar path, as it 
seems probable that any changes, if and when they come, will 
come through the courts, rather than through the legislature. 
This Note seeks to establish that the U.S. Supreme Court 
should raise the level of judicial review afforded to sexual orien-
tation for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.16  Once the 
Court makes this change, it should reach the same conclusion 
as the Ontario Court of Appeals did in Halpern because Can-
ada’s mode of constitutional analysis is similar to U.S. analysis 
of equal protection under an intermediate level of scrutiny.  Al-
though Halpern is analogous to the U.S. judicial review stan-
dard of intermediate scrutiny, the Halpern court’s analysis of 
the arguments given by the Attorney General would yield the 
same result under a rational review standard.  
In Part I, this Note examines Canadian case law leading up 
to Halpern with an emphasis on how judicial opinion regarding 
homosexuality and equality has evolved since the Charter’s in-
ception.  Part II focuses on the reasoning used by the Ontario 
Court of Appeals in declaring that prohibiting same-sex mar-
  
powers and violates equal protection.  The constitutionality of DOMA 
cannot be challenged, however, until a same-sex couple’s marriage, 
valid in one state, is denied recognition in another.   
Id.  
 14. DOMA Watch, available at http://www.domawatch.org/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2005).  The eleven states that do not have junior DOMA’s are 
the following: Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming.  Peterson, supra note 8.  But it should be noted that in New Hamp-
shire and Wyoming there is a state law that bans same-sex marriage and pre-
dates DOMA laws; and in Wisconsin there has been a state Supreme Court 
ruling stating that only heterosexual marriages are legal. Id. 
 15. See generally Halpern, 65 O.R.3d 161 (holding that the prohibition on 
same-sex marriage violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). 
 16. U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.  
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riages violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
and promoted principles “that are not justified in a free and 
democratic society” and how the court was able to reach its con-
clusion.17   Part III examines how the U.S. Supreme Court in-
terprets the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, with a 
particular focus on case law regarding sexual orientation.  Part 
IV discusses how the analysis used by the Canadian courts 
compares to that used by U.S. courts, and why U.S. courts 
should apply heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate on 
the basis of sexual orientation, as the Canadian courts do.  Part 
V shows that the Canadian court’s analysis is also applicable to 
the rational review test, so that under the rational review test 
the U.S. courts should determine that a ban on same-sex mar-
riage is unconstitutional.  Finally, Part VI shows that regard-
less of what standard of review the U.S. Supreme Court uses, it 
will be able to reach the same conclusion as Halpern.    
Traditionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has not looked to the 
decisions of other countries in interpreting the U.S. Constitu-
tion, and this Note does not propose that it do so.18  Instead, this 
Note proposes that if the U.S. Supreme Court affords sexual 
orientation the heightened level of scrutiny that it deserves, the 
court must draw the same conclusions as the Halpern court be-
cause the constitutional analysis is analogous.    
  
 17. See generally Halpern, 65 O.R.3d 161 (holding that the prohibition on 
same-sex marriage violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). 
 18. Cody Moon, Comparative Constitutional Analysis: Should the United 
States Supreme Court Join the Dialogue? 12 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 229, 240 
(2003).   
  However, evidence of the U.S. Supreme Court looking to foreign courts 
can be found in Lawrence v. Texas where the court stated,  
[T]o the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civili-
zation, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers 
have been rejected elsewhere.  The European Court of Human Rights 
has not followed Bowers but its own decision in Dudgeon v. United 
Kingdom.  Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an 
affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in 
intimate, consensual conduct.  The right petitioners seek in this case 
has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many 
other countries.  There has been no showing that in this country the 
government interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow 
more legitimate or urgent.  
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003). 
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I.  HISTORY OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HALPERN   
The court’s decision in Halpern was monumental, but it was 
only able to reach its conclusion by looking back to prior deci-
sions regarding sexual orientation and the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.  The Charter, which was adopted in 1982, is the 
Canadian Bill of Rights and it forms part of the Constitution of 
Canada.19  The purpose of the Charter is to ensure that the gov-
ernment respects the individual rights and freedoms of Cana-
dian citizens.20  Challenges to laws regarding the rights and 
freedoms of homosexuals are often analyzed under Section 15(1) 
and Section 1 of the Charter.21  Section 15(1) states that “Every 
individual is equal before and under the law and has the right 
to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without dis-
crimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on 
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or men-
tal or physical disability.”22  Section 1 states that “The Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and 
freedoms set out in it are subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.”23  If a law is challenged as being discrimina-
tory under Section 15(1) of the Charter, the court must first de-
termine whether the law actually is discriminating against a 
particular individual or group of people.24  If the law is found to 
be discriminatory the court then turns to Section 1 and deter-
mines whether the discrimination imposed by the law can be 
justified by a legitimate state interest.25    
Challenges regarding gay rights based on Section 15(1) and 
Section 1 of Charter of Rights and Freedoms began shortly after 
  
 19. Gutierrez, supra note 3, at 180 (The Charter applies to all federal and 
provisional levels of government and guarantees a set of civil liberties and 
fundamental rights that are protected from the actions of Parliament, provin-
cial legislatures, government agencies and officials.).  
 20. Id.  
 21. See, e.g., Halpern, 65 O.R.3d 161.  
 22. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms), §15. 
 23. CAN. CONST (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms), §1. 
 24. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 179. 
 25. Id. at 190–91.   See Part II for a more thorough discussion of Section 
15(1) and Section 1 of the Charter.  
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the Charter’s inception in 1982.26   Some of the earliest Charter 
cases involving same-sex discrimination were heard by appel-
late courts.  The first case worthy of note is Andrews v. Ontario 
(Minister of Health) for its use of a biological argument in sup-
porting discrimination against homosexuals.27   In Andrews, the 
court ruled that the Ontario Health Insurance Program did not 
violate Section 15(1) of the Charter by excluding same-sex cou-
ples and their children from the program.28  The court did not 
find a violation because it determined that, since heterosexual 
couples could marry, procreate, and raise children and same-sex 
couples could not, there are biological differences between the 
two groups.29  This “difference” allowed the court to determine 
that same-sex couples were not entitled to formal equality with 
heterosexual couples.30   The approach of heteronormativity ar-
ticulated in Andrews reverberated in subsequent cases.31   
One such case is Layland v. Ontario.32  In reaching its deci-
sion that same-sex couples were not legally entitled to marry, 
the court relied on the common law definition of marriage and 
what the court determined was the principle purpose of mar-
  
 26. Brenda Cossman, Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, 40 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 223, 225 (2002).  Prior to the 
inception of the Charter another significant victory in the battle for equality 
for gays and lesbians occurred in 1969 when Parliament decriminalized sod-
omy.  R. Douglas Elliot, The Canadian Earthquake: Same-Sex Marriage in 
Canada, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 591, 620 (2004).  “This particular revision to the 
Federal Criminal Code, applied across the nation and was justified on the 
grounds that the State had no business in the ‘bedrooms of the nations’ and 
‘what’s done in private between adults.’” Jane Adolphe, The Case Against 
Same-Sex Marriage in Canada: Law and Policy Considerations. 18 BYU J. 
PUB. L. 479, 487 (2004).  
  In contrast, the United States did not decriminalize sodomy until 2003 
in Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Court had to overturn a 1986 case which 
upheld the criminalization of sodomy.  See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 
U.S. 1039 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).   
 27. See generally Andrews v. Ontario (Minister of Health), [1988] 64 
O.R.2d 258 (holding that the Ontario Health Insurance Program did not vio-
late Section 15(1) of the Charter by excluding same-sex couples and their chil-
dren from the program).  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 21. 
 30. Id. at 38.   
 31. Cossman, supra note 26, at 225. 
 32. See generally Layland v. Ontario, [1993] 104 D.L.R. 214 (holding that 
same-sex couples were not legally entitled to marry).  
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riage – procreation.33  Procreation, the court wrote, cannot be 
achieved in same-sex unions “because of the biological limita-
tions of such a union.”34  Although the court found that dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation violated Section 
15(1) of the Charter, given that discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation was analogous to discrimination against any 
of the classes specifically referenced in Section 15(1) of the 
Charter, it did not find any discrimination in the prohibition 
against same-sex unions.35    
It was however, Justice Greer’s dissent in Layland that, a 
decade later, the majority in Halpern would echo.  Greer be-
lieved that it was not sufficient to simply look at the pre-
Charter cases to determine the definition of marriage.36  In-
stead, the concept needed to be placed “in the larger social con-
text of our modern-day society and its mores and expecta-
tions.”37  He went on to say that “choice” is a benefit of the law 
and a fundamental right which applies to marriage.38  Under 
Section 15(1), the right to choose is protected.39  Section 15(1) is 
also designed to protect those who are disadvantaged in society, 
and traditionally homosexuals have been subjected to discrimi-
nation.40  In addition to finding a violation under Section 15(1), 
  
 33. Id. at 219–23.  The court determined that the petitioners tried to use 
Section 15 of the Charter to alter the common law definition of marriage and 
the Charter does not serve that function.  Id. at 223.  Furthermore, the defini-
tion does not constitute a violation of Section 15.  Id.  A homosexual person is 
entitled to marry; he or she can marry someone of the opposite sex.  Id.  
 34. Id. at 223. The court did note that although not every heterosexual 
marriage produces children, the institution of marriage is intended by the 
state, religions, and society to encourage procreation.  Id.  
 35. Id.   
 36. Id. at 228 (Greer, J., dissenting). 
 37. Id.    
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 229. 
 40. Id.    
The historic disadvantage suffered by homosexual persons has been 
widely recognized and documented.  Public harassment and verbal 
abuse of homosexual individuals is not uncommon.  Homosexual 
women and men have been the victims of crimes and violence di-
rected at them specifically because of their sexual orientation. … 
They have been discriminated against in their employment and their 
access to services.  They have been excluded from some aspects of 
public life solely because of their sexual orientation. … The stigmati-
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Greer concluded that the law could not be saved by Section 1, 
because the government was not able to prove that the dis-
crimination imposed by the law was justified.41      
The first Charter case to reach the Supreme Court of Canada 
involving the issue of sexual orientation and equality was Egan 
v. Canada (A.G).42  In Egan, a homosexual couple challenged the 
definition of “spouse” as it appeared in the Old Age Security 
Act, claiming that the definition violated Section 15(1) of the 
Charter.43  The court unanimously held that even though sexual 
orientation was not explicitly listed in Section 15(1) of the Char-
ter, it was analogous to those classes that are enumerated in 
  
zation of homosexual persons and the hatred which some members of 
the public have expressed towards them has forced many homosexual 
persons to conceal their orientation.  This imposes its own associated 
costs in the workplace, the community and in private life. 
Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 184 (quoting Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 600-
02).  
 41. Layland, 104 D.L.R. at 233 (Greer, J., dissenting).   Justice Greer 
stated that while it is in the interest of the state to protect family relation-
ships, this interest should apply equally to both same-sex and heterosexual 
unions.  Id. It is discriminatory to say that the state only needs to preserve 
heterosexual families, and a rule with a discriminatory purpose is not justified 
under Section 1.  Id.  
 42. See generally Egan, 2 S.C.R. 513 (holding that the Old Age Security Act 
was constitutional because although declining benefits based on sexual orien-
tation was discriminatory under Section 15(1) of the Charter, the government 
established sufficient reasons for why the law was justified under Section 1).  
The first case to reach the Supreme Court of Canada involving gay equality 
rights was Mossop v. Canada, in which a gay man was denied the right by his 
employer to receive bereavement leave when his partner’s father died.  Mos-
sop v. Canada (A.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 construed in Cossman, supra note 
26, at 226–27.  The petitioner, however, did not challenge on Charter grounds.  
Id.  Instead, the petitioner claimed he was being discriminated against under 
the Human Rights Act on the basis of family status and not sexual orienta-
tion.  Id.  The Supreme Court dismissed the case stating that the denial was 
based on sexual orientation and not family status.  Id.  Since the petitioner 
did not raise any constitutional challenges there was no basis for his claim.  
Id.  
 43. Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 527.  “Spouse” is defined in 19(1) of the Old Age Se-
curity Act, R.S.C. 1985, which states that “spouse, in relation to any person, 
includes a person of the opposite sex who is living with that person, having 
lived with that person for a least one year, if the two persons have publicly 
represented themselves as husband and wife. …”  Id.  This definition extends 
to common law relationships.  Id.  The appellants claim that the definition is a 
violation of Section 15 of the Charter in that it discriminates on the basis of 
sexual orientation.  Id. at 527–28. 
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this section and, therefore, discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation was prohibited.44  Then, in reaching the conclusion that 
Section 1 permits the discrimination, the court determined that 
it was sound public policy for Parliament to favor and provide 
support for heterosexual married couples.45  Marriage, the court 
said, is “deeply rooted in our fundamental values and tradi-
tions, values and traditions that could not have been lost on the 
framers of the Charter.”46   
The Egan court then turned to the biological argument, that 
marriage is by nature heterosexual and grounded in the biologi-
cal and social realities that only heterosexual couples can pro-
create.47  Due to the important position marriage holds in soci-
ety and the unique needs of the union, the court held that Par-
liament is permitted to afford it special support and, therefore, 
the discrimination based on sexual orientation was found to be 
reasonable under Section 1.48     
Just five years after Egan, the Supreme Court ruled in 
Vriend v. Alberta that the denial of formal equality to homo-
sexuals was a violation of Section 15(1) and could not qualify as 
an exception under Section 1.49  In Vriend, a science laboratory 
coordinator was fired from his job at a Christian college because 
he was gay.50  While Vriend was not about same-sex marriage, it 
was a sign of the future: no longer would discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation survive a Charter challenge.51   
In the next case to reach the Supreme Court, M. v. H., the 
court declared the term “spouse,” as it appeared in the Family 
Law Act (FLA),52 a violation of the Charter.53  The court held 
  
 44. Id. at 528. 
 45. Id. at 536–37. 
 46. Id. at 535. 
 47. Id. at 536.   
 48. Id.  See also Cossman, supra note 26, at 229. 
 49. See generally Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (holding that a law 
cannot deny formal equality to homosexuals). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Cossman, supra note 26, at 232.   
 52. Family Law Act, R.S.O., ch. F.3, § 29 (1990) (Can.) (The Family Law 
Act provides a means for a person to petition the court to receive support from 
a spouse, or a man or woman with whom a person lived with in an opposite-
sex conjugal relationship.).   
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that the definition encompassed only opposite-sex couples and, 
as such, was a violation of Section 15(1) because it discrimi-
nated entirely on the basis of sexual orientation.54  In reaching 
this conclusion, the court determined that the denial of the po-
tential benefit gained from spousal support may create an eco-
nomic burden that would contribute to the “general vulnerabil-
ity by individuals in same-sex relationships.”55   The court held 
that when analyzing a benefit under Section 15(1), it must look 
beyond whether a party is conferred a benefit and examine 
whether he or she is denied access to a process that can give an 
economic or non-economic benefit.56  Moreover, there is a socie-
tal significance to receiving benefits under the FLA.  By exclud-
ing same-sex couples, the legislature was essentially stating 
that these relationships are less worthy of recognition and pro-
tection and are not able to create the intimate relationships 
that derive from economic interdependence.57   
Under the Section 1 analysis, the court determined that the 
government did not meet its burden, which is to prove that the 
discrimination imposed by the law is justified.58  To meet this 
burden, the legislature has to provide the court with evidence to 
support its claim and justification.59  The court concluded that 
  
 53. See generally M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (holding that the definition of 
spouse at it appeared in the Family Law Act was a violation of Section 15(1) 
because it discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation). 
 54. Id. at 57.   
 55. Id. at 61. 
 56. Id. at 60. 
 57. Id. at 62. 
 58. Id. at 63.   
 59. Id.  
In carrying out their duties, courts are not to second-guess legisla-
tures and the executives; they are not to make value judgments on 
what they regard as the proper policy choice; this is for the other 
branches.  Rather, the courts are to uphold the Constitution. … This 
court has often stressed the importance of deference to the policy 
choices of the legislature in the context of determining whether the 
legislature has discharged its burden of proof under Section 1 of the 
Charter. … Deference is not a kind of threshold inquiry under Section 
1.  As a general matter, the role of the legislature demands deference 
from the courts to those types of policy decisions that the legislature 
is best placed to make.  The simple or general claim that the in-
fringement of a right is justified under Section 1 is not such a deci-
sion.  The notion of judicial deference to legislative choices should 
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the exclusion of same-sex couples was not rationally related to 
the government’s objective under the FLA.60  The court noted 
that the objective of the FLA was to alleviate the financial bur-
den on a spouse when a relationship dissolved and that the ob-
jective would actually be enhanced if it included same-sex cou-
ples under the FLA.61 
It should be noted that the court specifically announced that 
it was not making any statement regarding same-sex marriage 
or on any related issues.62  Because the FLA applied to both 
married and unmarried opposite-sex couples, the court was only 
able to determine whether the FLA discriminated against same-
sex couples who were cohabitating in ways equivalent to cohabi-
tating opposite-sex couples.63 
Although the court did not make any determination with re-
gard to same-sex marriage, it did recognize that same-sex rela-
tionships are legitimate and entitled to legal protection.64    Fur-
thermore, the aftermath of the decision had other far reaching 
consequences.  The Ontario government amended sixty-seven 
statutes that included the term “spouse” to include same-sex 
partners in An Act to Amend Certain Statutes Because of the 
Supreme Court of Canada Decision in M. v. H.65  However, the 
Ontario government made these changes reluctantly.  Prime 
Minister Mike Harris stated “[t]his legislation is not part of 
our…agenda.  We are introducing this bill because of the Su-
preme Court of Canada’s decision.”66   Moreover, the legislature 
responded in a way the Supreme Court had not intended.67  In-
stead of creating a gender-neutral definition of the word 
  
not…be used to completely immunize certain kinds of legislative de-
cisions from Charter scrutiny. 
Id. at 59–60.  
 60. Id. at 69. 
 61. Id. at 73. 
 62. Id. at 58. 
 63. Id.  The court determined that same-sex couples are capable of forming 
conjugal relationships, even though they cannot “hold themselves out” as hus-
band and wife.  Id. at 51. 
 64. See generally M. v. H., 2 S.C.R. 3 construed in Cossman, supra note 26, 
at 235.  
 65. Id.   
 66. Jason Murphy, Dialogic Responses to M. v. H.: From Compliance to 
Defiance, 59 U.T. FAC. L. REV. 299, 305 (2001). 
 67. Id. 
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“spouse,” the government established a new category of rela-
tionship by calling it “same-sex partner,” thereby creating a 
separate but equal approach.68   
The federal government responded to M. v. H. by approving a 
motion stating that “it is necessary to state that marriage is 
and should remain the union of one man and one woman to the 
exclusion of all others,” and that Parliament “will take all nec-
essary steps within its jurisdiction to preserve this definition of 
marriage in Canada.”69   Although this motion was only sym-
bolic as it had no legal force, its symbolism was important be-
cause it reflected the federal government’s opposition to same-
sex marriages.70    
By the time M. v. H. was decided, it appeared that the Su-
preme Court of Canada had moved away from the biological 
argument used to deny equality based on sexual orientation, 
and towards recognizing equality for same-sex couples.  How-
ever, it is equally as clear that the elected government had not.    
  
 
The specific amendment to s. 29 of the FLA in that act inserted the 
following definition alongside that of "spouse": 'same-sex partner' 
means either of two persons of the same sex who have cohabited,  
(a) continuously for a period of not less than three years, or 
(b) in a relationship of some permanence, if they are the natural or 
adoptive parents of a child.  
Id. at n. 27. 
68Id. at 306.  
This separate but equal approach clashed dramatically with the posi-
tion held by same-sex rights activists that the order in M. v. H. re-
quired legislatures to include both opposite-sex and same-sex couples 
within a single definition of spouse. To do otherwise, they argued, 
went against the very spirit of the decision by affixing separate labels 
on the basis of sexual orientation.  
Id.  
 69. Cossman, supra note 26, at 237.  The federal government created the 
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act.  Murphy, supra note 66, at 
305.  
 70. Cossman, supra note 26, at 237.  While other provinces responded to 
the Supreme Court’s decision, only the responses of Ontario and the Federal 
Government bear directly on this note.  The U.S. federal government an-
nounced its views on marriage with DOMA and, like Canada’s government 
after M. v. H,, the United States is against same-sex unions.  Anti Gay Mar-
riage Act Clears Congress, CNN, Sept. 10, 1996, available at http:// 
www.cnn.com/US/9609/10/gay.marriage/.  Unlike Canada however, DOMA is 
not symbolic, but federal law.  28 U.S.C.A § 1738(C).  
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II.  HALPERN V. TORONTO71 
In Canada, as well as other jurisdictions around the world, 
same-sex marriage has been the subject of legal, political, and 
moral debate.72  In increments, the Supreme Court of Canada 
has extended certain benefits and rights to gays and lesbians.  
It was, therefore, only a matter of time before a challenge to the 
  
 71. As of this publication, Halpern has not been appealed and the federal 
government announced that it would not appeal the decision.  Elliot, supra 
note 26, at 613–14.  Instead, on July 16, 2003, the legislature referred a draft 
Bill entitled Proposal for an Act Respecting Certain Aspects of Legal Capacity 
for Marriage for Civil Purposes (“Proposed Act”) to the Canadian Supreme 
Court for an advisory opinion.  Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 Can. 
Sup. Ct. LEXIS 76 *16.  The Court was to determine the validity of the act.  
Id.  The relevant sections are as follows: Section 1: Marriage, for civil pur-
poses, is the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others; Section 
2: Nothing in this Act affects the freedom of officials of religious groups to 
refuse to perform marriages that are not in accordance with their religious 
beliefs.  Id. (construing Proposal for an Act Respecting Certain Aspects of Le-
gal Capacity for Marriage for Civil Purposes (“Proposed Act”)).   
  Three questions were presented to the Canadian Supreme Court to 
determine the validity of the act.  The three questions were as follows:  
1. Is the annexed Proposal for an Act Respecting Certain Aspects of 
Legal Capacity for Marriage for Civil Purposes within the exclusive 
legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada?  2.  If the answer 
to question 1 is yes, is section 1 of the proposal, which extends capac-
ity to marry to persons of the same sex, consistent with the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms?  3.  Does the freedom of religion 
guaranteed by paragraph 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms protect religious official from being compelled to perform a 
marriage between two persons of the same sex that is contrary to 
their religious beliefs.   
Id. at *17 
  In answering these questions, the Supreme Court determined that 
Section 1 of the Proposed Act is within the exclusive legislative competence of 
Parliament, while Section 2 is not.  Id.  Furthermore, the new definition of 
marriage is constitutional, and religious officials cannot be compelled to per-
form marriages contrary to their religious beliefs.  Id.  
After the decision by the court, the Bill will then be submitted to Parliament 
for a vote.  Elliot, supra note 26, at 613–14.  However, the legal definition of 
marriage has already been changed.  Id.  
 72. Mark D. Walters, Incorporating Common Law Into the Constitution of 
Canada: EGALE v. Canada and the Status of Marriage, 41 OSGOODE HALL 
L.J. 75, 78 (2003). 
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refusal to allow same-sex marriages appeared before the Cana-
dian courts.73      
A.  Facts of Halpern v. Toronto 
The lawsuit began over three years ago when seven same-sex 
couples (Couples) applied for civil marriage licenses from the 
Clerk of the City of Toronto.74  Instead of denying the licenses, 
the clerk stated that she would hold them in abeyance while 
waiting for directions from the courts.75  The Couples decided 
not to wait on the clerk and, instead, commenced their own ap-
plication.76  On August 22, 2000, the Couples’ application was 
transferred to the Divisional Court.77   
At about the same time that the Couples began their applica-
tion, the Metropolitan Community Church of Toronto (MCCT) 
decided it would marry homosexual couples in religious cere-
monies.78  The reason for this decision was MCCT’s learning 
that under the application of the laws of Ontario, the ancient 
Christian tradition of publishing the banns79 of marriage was a 
lawful alternative to a marriage license issued by municipal 
authorities.80  Two same-sex couples decided to marry at MCCT 
  
 73. In addition to Halpern, there were two other Canadian courts that 
sanctioned same-sex marriages.  Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 173.  In Quebec, in 
Hendricks v. Quebec (Attorney General) the court “declared invalid the prohi-
bition against same- sex marriages caused by the intersection of two federal 
statutes and the Civil Code of Quebec on the basis that it contravened Section 
15 (1) of the Charter and could not be saved under Section 1.”  Id. (quoting 
Hendricks v. Quebec, [2002] R.J.Q. 2506).  The declaration was stayed for two 
years to allow the legislature to respond.  Id. 
  In British Columbia, in EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney Gen-
eral), the Court of Appeals “declared the common law definition of marriage 
unconstitutional, substituted the words ‘two persons’ for ‘one man and one 
woman’ and suspended the declaration of unconstitutionality until July 12, 
2004, the expiration of the two-year suspension ordered by the Divisional 
Court in this case.”  Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 173 (quoting EGALE v. Canada, 
[2003] B.C.J. 994). 
 74. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 169. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at http://www.newadvent.org/ 
cathen/02255a.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).  Banns of marriage is the eccle-
siastical announcement of the names of persons contemplating marriage.  Id.  
 80. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 169.   
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in a religious ceremony, and thereafter, Reverend Brent 
Hawkes published their banns during services.81  Reverend 
Hawkes then married the couples, registered the marriages in 
the Church register, issued the couples marriage certificates, 
and submitted the required documents to the Office of the Reg-
istrar General.82   The Registrar refused to accept the docu-
ments, stating that the federal prohibition on same-sex mar-
riages prevented him from registering the marriages.83  In re-
sponse to the registrar’s assertion, MCCT brought an applica-
tion to the Divisional Court.84   
On July 12, 2002, for the first time in Canadian history, a 
court found that the common-law rule barring same-sex mar-
riage was unconstitutional.85  The Divisional Court found that 
the law was unconstitutional because it violated Section 15(1) of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and was not 
saved by Section 1 of the Charter.86   Although the decision re-
garding constitutionality was unanimous, the court was divided 
as to the appropriate remedy.87  The court, therefore, decided to 
suspend the remedy for twenty-four months to allow “Parlia-
  
 81. Id. at 170. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  By an order dated January 25, 2001, the applications of The Cou-
ples’ and MCCT were consolidated. Id.  On November 5-9, 2001, a three-
member panel, Justice LaForme, Justice Blair and Justice Smith, of the On-
tario Divisional Court heard the case.  Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 170 (citing 
Halpern v. Toronto, [2002] 60 O.R.3d 321).   
 85. Kathryn Chapman, Comment, Chronique De Jurisprudence: Halpern v. 
Toronto, 19 CAN. J. FAM. L. 423, 425 (2002).    
 86. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 170.  
 87. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 170–71.   
Smith A.C.J.S.C. was of the view that Parliament should legislate the 
appropriate remedy and that it should be given two years to do so, 
failing which the parties could return to the court to seek an appro-
priate remedy.  LaForme J. favoured immediate amendment, by the 
court, of the common law definition of marriage by substituting the 
words “two persons” for “one man and one woman.”  Blair R.S.J. 
adopted a middle position; he would have allowed Parliament two 
years to amend the common law rule, failing which the reformulation 
remedy proposed by LaForme J. would be automatically triggered.  It 
is Blair R.S.J.’s position that is reflected in the formal judgment of 
the court. 
Id. 
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ment to respond to the Charter violation by engaging in debate 
with respect to the social, religious, and other values related to 
marriage.”88  Before Parliament responded, however, the Attor-
ney General of Canada appealed89 and the Couples and MCCT 
cross appealed.90   
B. Decision in Halpern v. Toronto 
The question on appeal was whether Canada’s definition of 
marriage, which excludes same-sex couples from marrying, vio-
lates Section 2(a)91 or Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms in a way that cannot be permitted in a 
free and democratic society under Section 1 of the Charter.92  
The court put forth a detailed analysis, which ultimately led to 
its decision that denying same-sex couples the right to marry 
violated the Charter.93   
The court began by establishing that the definition of mar-
riage is found at common law.94  The definition was first es-
poused in Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee by Lord Penzance, in 
which he stated, “I conceive that marriage, as understood in 
Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the voluntary 
union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all 
others.”95   The court determined that the common law definition 
  
 88. Chapman, supra note 85, at 425. 
 89. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 171 (appealed on the equality issue). 
 90. Id.  The couples cross-appealed on the question of remedy alone.  Id. 
They sought “a declaration of unconstitutionality and a reformulation of the 
definition of marriage, both to take place immediately, and related personal 
remedies in the nature of mandamus.”  Id.  MCCT cross-appealed on the ques-
tion of remedy.  Id.  In addition, it cross-appealed that the current definition 
of marriage infringes its §§ 2(a) and §15(1) rights as a religious institution.  
Id.  
 91. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms), §§2(a).  Section 2(a) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
states, “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms (a) freedom of con-
science and religion.”  Id. The court determined that there was no violation of 
Section 2(a).  Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 171. 
 92. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 171. 
 93. See generally Halpern, 65 O.R.3d 161 (holding that the prohibition 
against same-sex marriage violated the Charter of Rights and Freedoms). 
 94. Id. at 173. 
 95. Hyde v. Hyde and Woodmansee L.R. 1 P&D. 130, 133 (1866).  *This 
has been the definition of marriage in Canada for all of the nation’s 136 years.  
Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 166. 
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of marriage violated the Couples’ equality rights on the basis of 
sexual orientation under Section 15(1) and that this violation 
could not be justified under Section 1.96   
In addition to the common law definition, the court noted that 
the word “marriage” appears in the Constitution Act, raising 
the question of whether a constitutional amendment was 
needed to change Canada’s definition of marriage.97  The court 
decided that an amendment was not needed because “marriage” 
did not have a constitutionally-fixed meaning, but was, instead, 
a flexible term that could change as Canadian society changed.98   
The court did not want to “freeze” the definition of marriage as 
to how it was defined in 1867 because that would be contrary to 
Canada’s progressive constitutional interpretation.99  The con-
stitution, the court noted, “must be capable of growth and de-
velopment over time to meet new social, political and historical 
realities often unimagined by its framers.”100   Since the term 
“marriage” was flexible there was no need for constitutional 
amendment procedures.101  Because a constitutional amendment 
was not needed, both the courts and Parliament were free to 
alter the law without resorting to the intricacies and difficulties 
of the amendment process.  After determining that an amend-
ment was not needed, the court went on to discuss whether 
prohibiting same-sex marriage violated the Charter.  
  
 96. Id. at 196.  The court ultimately determined that the common law defi-
nition did not infringe freedom of religion rights under §§ 2(a) of the Charter.  
Id. 
 97. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 174 (construing CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 
1867) §§ 91(26), 92(12)).   
The Association for Marriage and Family in Ontario takes the posi-
tion that the word ‘marriage as used in the Constitution Act, 1867 is 
a constitutionally entrenched term that refers to the legal definition 
of marriage that existed at Confederation’… that being the ‘union of 
one man and one woman.’ As such the definition can only be amended 
by formal constitutional amendment procedures. 
Id.  
 98. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 176.  
 99. Halpern ,65 O.R.3d at 175.  The court also noted that “[t]he British 
North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capable of growth and 
expansion within its natural limits.” Id. at 175 (quoting Edwards v. A.G. Can-
ada [1930] A.C. 124, 136).  
 100. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 175. 
 101. Id. at 176.   
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1. Section 15(1) of the Charter  
As stated above, Section 15(1) provides that “every individual 
is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination 
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, na-
tional or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability.”102  Not every distinction created by the legis-
lature, however, is discriminatory.103  A Section 15(1) violation is 
found only when the law in question conflicts with the purpose 
of Section 15(1).104  The purpose of Section 15(1) is  
to prevent the violation of essential human dignity and free-
dom through the imposition of disadvantaging, stereotyping, 
or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society in 
which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human be-
ings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable and 
equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.105   
To determine whether a conflict exists under Section 15(1), 
the Supreme Court in Law v. Canada created a three-stage in-
quiry: 
1.  Does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction be-
tween the claimant and others on the basis of one or more per-
sonal characteristics, or (b) fail to take into account the claim-
ant’s already disadvantaged position within Canadian society 
resulting in  substantially differential treatment between the 
claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal char-
acteristics? 
2.   Is the claimant subject to differential treatment based on 
one or more enumerated and analogous grounds? 
3.  Does the differential treatment discriminate, by imposing a 
burden upon or withholding a benefit for the claimant in a 
manner which reflects the stereotypical application of pre-
sumed group or personal characteristics, or which otherwise 
has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the 
individual is less capable or worthy of recognition or value as a 
  
 102. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms), §15(1). 
 103. M. v. H., 2 S.C.R. at 59. 
 104. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 179. 
 105. Id. (quoting Law v. Canada [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, 529). 
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human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally de-
serving of concern, respect, and consideration? 106 
Stage 1:  
In Stage 1, the court must determine whether the law: a) 
draws a formal distinction between the claimant and others on 
the basis of one or more personal characteristics; or b) fails to 
take into account the claimant’s already disadvantaged position 
within Canadian society resulting in substantively differential 
treatment between the claimant and others on the basis of one 
or more personal characteristics.107   Here, the claimant must 
decide the relevant group to compare himself or herself to for 
the purpose of determining if the claimants are receiving differ-
ential treatment.108  In Halpern, the couples determined that the 
relevant group was opposite-sex couples, since only opposite-sex 
couples have the legal right to marry.109  The Attorney General 
argued that, due to the enactment of the Modernization of 
Benefits and Obligations Act,110 which gave same-sex couples 
substantive equal benefits and protection of the federal law, 
same-sex couples do not receive differential treatment.111  The 
court disagreed with the Attorney General’s argument and 
found that, even with the Modernization of Benefits and Obliga-
tions Act, same-sex couples were, in fact, receiving differential 
  
 106. Law, 1 S.C.R. at 548–49.  The claimant has the burden of establishing 
each of these factors on a balance of probabilities.  Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 179. 
 107. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 179. 
 108. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 180. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, S.C., ch. 12, §1.(1) 
(2000) (Can.). 
 111. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 180. The government argued that the institution 
of marriage does not allow a distinction between opposite-sex and same-sex 
couples: “The word marriage is a descriptor of a unique opposite-sex bond that 
is common across different times, cultures and religions as a virtually univer-
sal norm.” Id.  Additionally, the government argued that marriage is not a 
common law concept, but instead is a historical and worldwide institution that 
predates the Canadian legal framework.  Id. Moreover, the definition of mar-
riage is not the source of the differential treatment, the source is the legisla-
tion that gives the authority to provide government benefits and obligations.  
Id.  Since the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act was enacted, 
same-sex couples receive substantive equal benefits from the government and 
protection of the federal law.  Id. 
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treatment.112  This determination was founded on the fact that 
legislatures give various rights and obligations based on the 
institution of marriage, such as licensing and registration, so 
that the marriage can be recognized by law.113  Same-sex couples 
are denied access to these rights and obligations, and this de-
nial constitutes differential treatment.114  Moreover, the common 
law definition of marriage creates a distinction between oppo-
site and same-sex couples on the basis of their sexual orienta-
tion.  Since a distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex 
couples was found, the first stage of the Section 15(1) inquiry 
was satisfied.115 
Stage 2: 
In determining Stage two of the inquiry the court looked to 
the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Egan v. Canada.116   
Recognizing that although there are specific grounds enumer-
ated in Section 15(1) such as race and religion, the Egan court 
determined that sexual orientation was analogous to those al-
ready listed in the Charter.117  In Egan, the Supreme Court first 
recognized sexual orientation as an analogous ground deserving 
of protection when it stated that sexual orientation is a “deeply 
personal characteristic that is either unchangeable or change-
able only at unacceptable personal costs.”118   Since the Supreme 
Court had previously determined that sexual orientation was 
an analogous ground, Stage two was met.119 
  
 112. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 180–81.  
 113. Id. at 181. 
 114. Id. (“Once the state does provide a benefit it is obliged to do so in a non-
discriminatory manner. …In many circumstances, this will require govern-
ments to take positive action, for example by extending the scope of a benefit 
to a previously excluded class of persons.”). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 182. See generally Egan, 2 S.C.R. 513 (holding 
that sexual orientation is analogous to the specific grounds already listed in 
Section 15(1) of the Charter).   
 117. Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 528. 
 118. Id.    
 119. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 183.   
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Stage 3: 
For the third stage of the inquiry, the court focused on sub-
stantive equality, not formal equality, with the emphasis on 
human dignity.120  Here, the court was required to consider the 
individual’s or group’s traits, history, and circumstances to 
evaluate whether a reasonable person in similar circumstances 
would find that the law in question differentiates the couples in 
a way that demeans their dignity.121  The court also examined 
the purpose and effect of the law.122   A law that has a discrimi-
natory purpose cannot survive Section15(1) scrutiny.  However, 
in order to successfully challenge the law, the claimant does not 
have to show a discriminatory purpose; a discriminatory effect 
will suffice.123     
To determine if a law has a discriminatory purpose or effect, 
the court examines four factors.124  These four factors are 1) pre-
existing disadvantage, stereotyping or vulnerability of the 
claimants; 2) correspondence between the grounds and the 
  
 120. Id.   
Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect 
and self-worth.  It is concerned with physical and psychological integ-
rity and empowerment.  Human dignity is harmed by unfair treat-
ment premised upon the personal traits or circumstances which do 
not relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits.  It is enhanced by 
laws which are sensitive to the needs, capacities, and merits of differ-
ent individuals, taking into account the context underlying their dif-
ferences.  Human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are 
marginalized, ignored, or devalued, and is enhanced when laws rec-
ognize the full place of all individuals and groups within Canadian 
society.  Human dignity within the meaning of the equality guaran-
tee does not relate to the status of position of an individual in society 
per se, but rather concerns the manner in which a person legiti-
mately feels when confronted with a particular law.  Does the law 
treat him or her unfairly, taking into account all of the circumstances 
regarding the individuals affected and excluded by the law?  
Id. (quoting Law, 1 S.C.R. at 530). 
 121. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 183. 
 122. Id. at 183. 
 123. Id.  (“[A]ny demonstration by a claimant that a legislative provision or 
other state action has the effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that 
the individual is less capable, or less worthy of recognition or value as a hu-
man being or as a member of Canadian society…will suffice to establish an 
infringement of Section 15(1).”).  
 124. Id. 
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claimant’s actual needs, capacities or circumstances; 3) amelio-
rative purpose or effects on more disadvantaged individuals or 
groups in society; and 4) nature of the interest affected.125   All 
four factors do not have to be met for the court to determine 
that a law is discriminatory.126 
While not dispositive, the first factor is “probably the most 
compelling factor favouring a conclusion that differential 
treatment imposed by legislation is truly discriminatory.”127  The 
court stated that homosexual persons have been disadvantaged 
throughout Canada’s history. 128  However, the court also noted 
that a particular legislation may not be discriminatory if the 
distinction created by the law respects the group’s or individ-
ual’s liberty interest in making fundamental decisions regard-
ing their lives.129  
One of the essential values is liberty, basically defined as the 
absence of coercion and the ability to make fundamental 
choices with regard to one’s life. …Limitations imposed by this 
court that serve to restrict this freedom of choice among per-
sons in conjugal relationships would be contrary to our notions 
of liberty.130   
The court held that the common law definition, requiring mar-
riage to be between two people of the opposite sex denies people 
in same-sex relationships a fundamental choice, whether or not 
to marry their partner.131   
The second factor is the “correspondence, or lack thereof, be-
tween the grounds on which the claim is based and the actual 
  
 125. Id. at 183–90. 
 126. Id. at 183 (“The list of factors is not closed and not all of the factors will 
be relevant in every case.”).  
 127. Id. at 183–84 (quoting Law, 1 S.C.R. at 534).  
 128. Id. at 184.   
Sexual orientation is more than simply a “status” that an individual 
possesses.  It is something that is demonstrated in an individual’s 
conduct by the choice of partner….Studies serve to confirm over-
whelmingly that homosexuals, whether as individuals or couples, 
form an identifiable minority who have suffered and continue to suf-
fer serious social, political and economic disadvantage. 
Id. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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needs, capacities, or circumstances of the claimant or others 
with similar traits.”132   Legislation that accommodates the ac-
tual needs, capacities, and circumstances of the claimants is 
less likely to demean dignity.133  Here, the government argued 
that marriage relates to the needs, capacities, and circum-
stances of opposite-sex couples.134   The court rejected this ar-
gument because the question to be determined is whether the 
law takes into account the needs, capacities, or circumstances of 
same-sex, not opposite-sex couples.135  The purpose and effect of 
the law in question must be viewed from the perspective of the 
claimant, and here, the court determined that from the perspec-
tive of same-sex couples, the law did not meet their needs, ca-
pacities, or circumstances.136  
The reason the law did not meet same-sex couple’s needs, ca-
pacities, or circumstances was because the law prevented them 
from receiving the benefits of marriage.  The court determined 
that the recognized purposes of marriage include companion-
ship, societal recognition, economic benefits, blending of two 
families, and intimacy.137  In addition to the denial of these 
benefits, prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying would 
perpetuate the view that same-sex couples are not capable of 
having the same type of relationship as opposite-sex couples 
and that their relationships are not deserving of the same re-
spect and recognition afforded to opposite-sex couples.138   
Moreover, the court determined that the government’s argu-
ment here is more suited for a Section 1 and not a Section 15(1) 
analysis because the Section 15(1) analysis at this stage re-
  
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 186. (“[T]he fact that the impugned legislation may achieve a 
valid social purpose for one group of individuals cannot function to deny an 
equality claim where the effects of the legislation upon another person or 
group conflict with the purpose of the § 15(1) guarantee.”).  
 136. Id. at 187.  
 137. Id. 
 138. Id.  The government also argued that marriage as an institution is for 
the capacities, needs and circumstances of heterosexual couples:  “The concept 
of marriage – across time, societies and legal cultures – is that of an institu-
tion to facilitate, shelter and nurture the unique relationship of a man and a 
woman who, together, have the possibility to bear children from their rela-
tionship and shelter them within it.” Id. at 185–86.   
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quires the court to “define the scope of the individual’s right to 
equality, not to balance that right against societal values and 
interests or other Charter rights.”139  Any balancing is done un-
der Section 1.    
The third factor is whether the law has “an ameliorative pur-
pose or effect upon a more disadvantaged person or group in 
society.”140  It was clear to the court that throughout Canada’s 
history opposite-sex couples were more advantaged than same-
sex couples.141   In effect the court took judicial notice of the exis-
tence of this advantage, which allowed the court to determine 
that the third factor was met.142  
The fourth factor is the “nature of the interest affected by the 
law.”143  The court stated that “[T]he more severe and localized 
the effect of the law on the affected group, the greater the like-
lihood that the law is discriminatory.”144  The Attorney General 
  
 139. Id. at 186.  
 140. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 187.  In Law, the court stated that “under-
inclusive ameliorative legislation that excludes from its scope the members of 
a historically disadvantaged group will rarely escape the charge of discrimina-
tion.” Id. (quoting Law, 1 S.C.R. at 539).  
 141. Id. at 188.  
 142. Id. at 187–88.  The government proposed that because heterosexual 
couples raise most of societies’ children, supporting these unions does not 
further a historic advantage but, instead, ameliorates historic economic dis-
advantage that opposite-sex couples are faced with when raising children.  Id. 
at 187.  
 143. Id. at 188.   
 144. Id.  For an example of how the courts determine this inquiry, Halpern 
cited Law. Id.  In Law, the court stated that the Charter protects more than 
economic rights: 
Although a search for economic prejudice may be a convenient means 
to begin a Section 15 inquiry, a conscientious inquiry must not stop 
here.  The discriminatory caliber of a particular distinction cannot be 
fully appreciated without also evaluating the constitutional and so-
cietal significance of the interest(s) adversely affected.  Other impor-
tant considerations involve determining whether the distinction 
somehow restricts access to a fundamental social institution, or af-
fects a basic aspect of full membership in Canadian society (e.g. vot-
ing, mobility).  Finally, does the distinction constitute a complete 
non-recognition of a particular group?  It stands to reason that a 
group’s interests will be more adversely affected in cases involving 
complete exclusion or non-recognition than in cases where the legisla-
tive distinction does recognize or accommodate the group, but does so 
in a manner that is simply more restrictive than some would like.   
Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 188 (quoting Law, 1 S.C.R. at 540).   
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pointed to the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act to 
preclude a finding of discrimination.145  The court, however, 
found that the Act did not give the same benefits and obliga-
tions to same-sex couples146 and, moreover, even under the Act, 
same-sex couples were excluded from the actual act of partici-
pating in a legal marriage, an important and vital social insti-
tution.147  The court held that Section 15 guarantees more than 
equal access to economic benefits; it also guarantees equal ac-
cess to fundamental social institutions, such as marriage.148   
Once the court determined that the common law definition of 
marriage violated Section 15(1) of the Charter, the court then 
examined whether the violation could be justified under Section 
1 of the Charter.149 
2. Section 1 Analysis 
Section 1 states that “the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it are 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”150  If 
a law violates Section 15(1) of the Charter, it can be upheld if it 
is justified under Section 1.151  The party who wants the law up-
  
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 189. (In numerous cases, benefits and obligations under the 
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act are only given to same-sex 
couples after they have lived together for a certain period of time, whereas 
opposite-sex couples got them immediately.). 
 147. Id. (The court must consider whether the affected group has been ex-
cluded from “fundamental societal institutions.”). 
 148. Id. at 190. 
 149. Id. 
 150. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms), §1. 
 151. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 190.  Section 1 analysis requires a balancing of 
an individual’s right against the state’s interest, however a Section 15(1) 
analysis does not have this requirement.  CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 
1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), §1, construed in 
Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769, 809–10.  Section 15(1), requires the 
courts to “define the scope of the individual right to equality.”  Id.  Under Sec-
tion 15(1), a claimant must provide a rational foundation for the experience of 
discrimination and demonstrate that a similarly situated rational person 
would share that experience; however, Section 1 requires the government to 
justify that discrimination, not to explain it or deny its existence.  Id.  
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held must establish the justification for the law and has the 
burden of proving that: 
1. the objective of the law is pressing and substantial; and 
2. the means chosen to achieve the objective are reasonably 
and demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.  
This requires: 
(A) The rights violation to be rationally connected to the 
objective of the law; 
(B) The impugned law to minimally impair the Charter 
guarantee; and 
(C) Proportionality between the effect of the law and its ob-
jective so that the attainment of the objective is not out-
weighed by the abridgment of the right.152  
At this stage, the burden was on the government to demon-
strate a justification for the breach of human dignity caused by 
the law.153  To meet its burden, the government could show the 
practical, moral, economic, or social aspects of the law by dem-
onstrating a need to protect other rights in the Charter, or by 
establishing that what the law purports to do outweighs its 
negative impact on human dignity.154    
When the law in question is challenged as being under-
inclusive, as it is here, the objective of the entire law must be 
examined along with the objective of the exclusion.155  Here, the 
Attorney General argued that throughout history marriage has 
always been between a man and a woman, and the purpose of 
marriage is for uniting the opposite sexes, promoting compan-
ionship, and encouraging procreation.156  While the court agreed 
  
 152. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 191 (quoting R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 
138–39).  The Oakes court was the first court to formulate the test for deter-
mining whether a law is a reasonable limit on a Charter right or freedom in a 
free and democratic society.  Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 191.  This became known 
as the Oakes test.  Id.  The first stage of the Oakes test involves two steps: 
first the objectives of the impugned law must be determined, and secondly, the 
objective of the impugned law must be evaluated to see if the objective is ca-
pable of justifying limitations on Charter rights.  Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 191 
(interpreting R. v. Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 138–39).   
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. at 186.  
 155. Id. at 191. 
 156. Id. at 191–92. 
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that this has historically been the accepted notion of marriage, 
the question before the court was whether perpetuating this 
concept is a valid objective and whether the Attorney General 
had given valid arguments for the court to support and per-
petuate this definition of marriage.157  The court determined it 
was not a valid objective and disagreed with all three rationales 
put forth by the Attorney General.158   
First, the court noted that merely stating that marriage is 
heterosexual because it always has been that way is not an ob-
jective that can justify infringing upon a Charter value.159  The 
court then went on to dismiss the other arguments provided by 
the Attorney General.  The first purpose given by the Attorney 
General stated that marriage unites the opposite sexes.160  The 
court held that this purpose values one form of relationship 
over another and suggests that same-sex relationships are not 
as legitimate as opposite-sex relationships.161  A purpose that 
demeans the dignity of same-sex couples cannot be pressing and 
substantial, since it is contrary to the values of a free and de-
mocratic society.162  Second, the encouragement of procreation 
will not be impeded by allowing same-sex couples to marry and 
heterosexual couples will not stop procreating if same-sex cou-
ples are entitled to marry.163  Moreover, heterosexual couples 
and same-sex couples can adopt and heterosexual couples can 
choose to not have children.164  Last, the third argument was 
dismissed because encouraging companionship only between 
opposite-sex couples perpetuates the notion that same-sex cou-
ples are not equally capable of forming loving relationships.165   
While the court’s conclusion under the first stage of the 
analysis was sufficient to determine that the Attorney General 
did not meet his burden, the court went on to consider the re-
mainder of the test.166  Under the rational connection test, the 
  
 157. Id. at 192.  
 158. Id. at 193. 
 159. Id. at 192. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 192–93. 
 165. Id. at 193.  
 166. Id. 
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party seeking to uphold the law must show that the violation of 
rights is rationally related to the objective.167  Here, the govern-
ment would have to show that the exclusion of same-sex couples 
from marriage is required to encourage procreation, childrear-
ing, and companionship.168  The court held that the rational 
connection test was not met because the “exclusion of same-sex 
couples from marriage is not necessary for the promotion of pro-
creation, childrearing, and companionship.”169   The court found 
that the law was both under and over-inclusive.170  It was over-
inclusive because the ability to naturally conceive children and 
willingness to raise children are not prerequisites for opposite-
sex marriage.171  The law was under-inclusive because it ex-
cluded same-sex couples who have and raise children.172  The 
court determined that even if it had concluded that the Attor-
ney General’s objectives were pressing and substantial, these 
objectives were not rationally connected to the opposite-sex re-
quirement for marriage.173 
As for minimal impairment,174 because same-sex couples were 
completely excluded from the institution of marriage, it was 
clear that there was significantly more impairment than 
“minimal.”175  Furthermore, the court stated that any alterna-
  
 167. Id. at 194.  
 168. Id. 
 169. Id 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id.  
 174. Minimal impairment relates to the second prong of the Oakes test.  See 
supra Part II.B.2. 
 175. Id. at 196. The Attorney General submitted that the means chosen by 
Parliament to achieve its objectives impairs the rights of gays and lesbians as 
minimally as possible:   
Although same-sex relationships are not granted legal recognition, 
gay men and lesbians have the right to choose their partners and to 
celebrate their relationships through commitment ceremonies.  Addi-
tionally, same-sex couples have achieved virtually all of the federal 
benefits that flow from marriage with the passing of the Moderniza-
tion of Benefits and Obligations Act.   
Id. at 195. 
  The court, however, did not accept this assertion, and stated it did not 
believe that same-sex couples have achieved equal access to government bene-
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tive to the legal institution of marriage was not an adequate 
substitute.176   
Under the Section 1 analysis, the court determined that the 
Attorney General’s objectives for the prohibition against same-
sex marriage did not justify the exclusion of same-sex couples 
from the institution of marriage.177 
3.  Remedy 
To remedy the situation, the court replaced the common law 
definition of marriage with a new definition of its own creation: 
“The voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion of 
all others.”178  The court also determined that this definition was 
to have immediate effect, that the Clerk of the City of Toronto 
was to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and that the 
Registrar General of the Province of Ontario was to accept the 
marriage certificates of same-sex couples.179  
III. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE IN THE UNITED STATES  
Canada is not the only nation to grapple with same-sex mar-
riage, nor are its courts the only courts to establish under which 
standard of constitutionality a law prohibiting same-sex couples 
to marry should be scrutinized.  The U.S. court system has also 
been called upon to address issues of gay rights, although its 
highest court has not yet addressed the issue of same-sex mar-
riage.   Looking at how the U.S. courts interpret the Equal Pro-
tection Clause and how the Supreme Court of the United States 
has applied the clause to laws which discriminate on the basis 
of homosexuality will help to understand how the Court will 
rule on the issue of same-sex marriage if, or when, it appears 
before it.  
  
fits and that marriage should not be viewed purely in economic terms. Id. at 
194–95.  
 176. Id. at 195 (“Same-sex couples and their children should be able to bene-
fit from the same stabilizing institution as their opposite-sex counterparts.”). 
 177. Id. at 196.  
 178. Id. at 197. 
 179. Id. at 199. 
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A.  Origins and Background  
Justice Harlan, in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, stated 
“[i]n view of the Constitution, in the eyes of the law, there is in 
this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens…. 
The Equal Protection Clause neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens.”180  The basis for equal protection is 
found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.181  
It states that no state shall “deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the law.”182  The interpretation of 
the amendment has been left mainly to the Supreme Court.183  
The Equal Protection Clause comes into play whenever the gov-
ernment treats two groups differently.   
When determining whether a particular statute is a violation 
of equal protection rights, a U.S. court must first decide the ap-
propriate standard of review.184  To do this, the court must as-
certain the basis for the claim of discrimination, such as race, 
gender, or sexual orientation.185  These and other categories of 
discrimination have been divided into three levels of review; 
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis.186   
  
 180. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), 
overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).  Harlan went on to 
say that “[T]he thin disguise of equal accommodation will not mislead anyone, 
nor atone for the wrong this day.”  Id. at 562. 
 181. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1. 
 182. Id. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.  
Id. 
 183. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 
601–04 (2002).  “More than a century after the adoption of the fourteenth 
amendment, the question of the inherent content of equal protection continues 
to be a subject of intense debate.” Id. at 601. 
 184. Nancy G. Maxwell, Opening Civil Marriage to Same-Gender Couples: A 
Netherlands-United States Comparison, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW. 141, 
159 (2001). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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Strict scrutiny, the highest standard of review, is applied to 
classes of discrimination that the court deems “suspect 
classes.”187  This includes claims of unequal treatment based on 
race, alienage, or national origin.188   If a law is subjected to this 
level of review, it will be declared unconstitutional unless the 
state can provide a “compelling state interest”189 and that the 
discriminatory means employed substantially relate to the 
achievement of the state interest.190  Under this analysis, most 
statutes will be struck down.191   This is because the state must 
show the law is “necessary to the accomplishment of some per-
missible state objective, independent of the discrimination….,”192 
which places an exceptionally high burden on the state. 
At the middle level, which encompasses “quasi-suspect 
classes” such as gender and illegitimacy, the court will apply 
heightened, or intermediate scrutiny.193  This level requires the 
state to show that “the legislative use of the classification ‘re-
flects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal 
protection that furthers a substantial interest of the state.’”194  
Under intermediate scrutiny, the party seeking to defend the 
law must show an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the 
law.195   The Court in United States v. Virginia stated that the 
state must show “at least that the challenged classification 
serves important governmental objectives and that the dis-
criminatory means employed are substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives.”196  The Court went on to state 
that “[t]he justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or 
invented post hoc in response to litigation.”197   
  
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 
(1985).  
 190. See e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
 191. Maxwell, supra note 184, at 159. 
 192. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. 
 193. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 183, at 647.    
 194. Maxwell, supra note 184, at 159–60. 
 195. See e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (This case con-
cerned a gender based law.).   
 196. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Wengler v. Drug-
gists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)). 
 197. Id. at 533.  
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Classification based on gender receives heightened review be-
cause these classifications “very likely reflect outmoded notions 
of the relative capabilities of men and women.”198  Moreover, 
classifications based on illegitimacy receive intermediate scru-
tiny because “illegitimacy is beyond the individual’s control and 
bears no relation to the individual’s ability to participate in and 
contribute to society.”199 
The lowest level of review, the “rational basis” test, is used 
when there is no suspect classification involved.200  The Supreme 
Court has determined that age,201 poverty,202 mental retarda-
tion,203 and sexual orientation204 are not suspect classes.  Under 
rational review it is the petitioner who has the burden of dem-
onstrating that the discrimination is not “rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.”205  Typically, statutes which 
come under the rational basis test are found to be constitu-
  
 198. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.  See also Josiah N. Drew, Caught 
Between the Scylla and Charybdis: Ameliorating the Collision Course of Sex-
ual Orientation Anti-discrimination Rights and Religious Free Exercise Rights 
in the Public Workplace 16 BYU J.PUB. L. 287, 301 (2002).   
 199. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (quoting Matthew v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 
495, 505 (1976)).  See also Drew, supra note 198, at 287.  
 200. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441 (quoting Matthew v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 
495, 505 (1976)).  See also Drew, supra note 198, at 287. 
 201. See generally Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 
(1976) (holding that laws that discriminate on the basis of age should only 
receive rational basis review).   
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly 
free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been 
discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not 
experienced a “history of purposeful unequal treatment” or been sub-
jected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics 
not truly indicative of their abilities. 
Id. at 313.  
 202. See generally James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (holding that 
laws that discriminate on the basis of wealth should only receive rational 
basis review).   See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (stating 
that this Court has held repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a sus-
pect classification). 
 203. See generally City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441–43 (holding that laws 
that discriminate on the basis of mental retardation should only receive ra-
tional basis review).   
 204. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that laws 
that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation should only receive ra-
tional basis review).   
 205. Id. 
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tional, since all the court requires to uphold the law is a legiti-
mate government reason for the discrimination, a very low bur-
den for the state.206   
To determine whether a suspect class or quasi-suspect class 
is involved, the court uses a three-part analysis.207  The origin of 
this three-part test comes from often cited Footnote 4 of the 
United States v. Carolene Products.208  First, the court looks to 
see if the class has a history of discrimination.209  Second, the 
court determines the immutability of the class characteristic.210  
Finally, the court examines whether the class is politically pow-
erless enough to command extraordinary protection from the 
majoritarian political process.211   
B.  Equal Protection Cases and Their Application to Sexual  
Orientation  
The two most notable Supreme Court cases addressing sexual 
orientation and equal protection are Romer v. Evans and Law-
rence v. Texas.212  In Romer, the Colorado legislature enacted a 
law that denied homosexuals any express statutory protec-
tions.213  The law prohibited “all legislative, executive or judicial 
action at any level of state or local government designed to pro-
tect the named class.”214  The named class was homosexual per-
sons.215  By applying the rational basis test the Court deter-
  
 206. Id. 
 207. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearing Office, 895 F.2d 563, 
573 (9th Cir. 1990).  See also Timothy Verhoff, Comment, Class Struggles: A 
Century After the Ku Klux Klan Act and Still Seeking Protection for the Dis-
abled, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 153, 168 (1999). 
 208. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 209. Drew, supra note 198, at 303.  
 210. Id. 
 211. San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 
(1973).  See also Verhoff, supra note 207, at 168.   
 212. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (striking down the Colo-
rado law as discriminatory on the basis of sexual orientation).  See generally 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (striking down a Texas anti sodomy law as a 
violation of due process).  The majority decided Lawrence on Due Process 
grounds, however, Justice O’Connor, in her concurrence stated that she would 
have decided the case on the basis of equal protection.   Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
564, 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 213. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
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mined that the Colorado state law was a violation of equal pro-
tection.216  Since the Court concluded that the law’s only purpose 
was animus towards a particular group of people, namely ho-
mosexuals, the Court found that the law could not survive even 
under the rational review test. 217   Since the Court held that the 
law failed under rational review, it did not need to address the 
question of whether a heightened standard of review for sexual 
orientation was required.218     
Of particular concern to the Court was how the state at-
tempted to use the Equal Protection Clause to further its desire 
to harm a politically unpopular group.219  The Court stated that 
at a bare minimum the Equal Protection Clause could not allow 
this.220  It further determined that a statute that “classifies ho-
mosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make 
them unequal to everyone else” will be unconstitutional.221  This 
  
 216. See generally Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (striking down the Colorado law and 
holding that the law was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).  In this 
case, Colorado enacted a law known as Amendment 2 which essentially de-
nied homosexuals the right to receive aid from the government.  Id. at 624.  
The statute stated: 
No protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Ori-
entation.  Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches 
or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, mu-
nicipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any stat-
ute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or 
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall consti-
tute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of per-
sons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, pro-
tected status or claim of discrimination.  This Section of the Constitu-
tion shall be in all respects self-executing.   
Id. at 624. 
 217. Id. at 633 (“[B]y requiring that the classification bear a rational rela-
tionship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that 
classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group bur-
dened by the law.”). 
 218. See generally Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (striking down the Colorado law and 
holding that the law was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).    
 219. Id. at 634.  The state argued that by removing these rights from homo-
sexual citizens of Colorado, it was putting them in the same place, politically, 
as the rest of its citizens.  Id. at 626.  The statute, the state said, does no more 
than deny homosexuals special rights.  Id.  
 220. Id. 
 221. Mark Strasser, Loving in the New Millennium: On Equal Protection 
and the Right to Marry, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH ROUNDTABLE 61, 78 (2000). 
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analysis is in line with Canada’s determination that homosexu-
als in Canadian society have been subjected to discrimination in 
a way that makes them unequal to everyone else and, therefore, 
under Section 15(1) and Section 1 of the Charter, are entitled to 
protection.222  The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution, like Section 15(1) of the Charter, is to protect po-
litically unpopular and disadvantaged groups.223 
The Romer Court’s decision demonstrates that the Supreme 
Court is gradually becoming more sensitive to gay and lesbian 
rights.224  However, Romer only determined that a bare desire to 
harm a group is not a legitimate interest.225  Therefore, with 
only Romer as precedent it would be difficult for the Court to 
strike down a state law that banned same-sex marriage.  The 
rational basis test would likely allow a state to produce what 
the Court could determine to be a legitimate government inter-
est.226  Moreover, many lawyers have found the Court’s reason-
ing in Romer evasive, and have criticized it for not providing an 
enduring or workable legal framework, which the Court had 
done in previous race and gender cases.227    
It is yet to be determined whether Lawrence v. Texas, the 
next case addressing constitutional questions concerning sexual 
orientation and equal protection, created the legal framework 
necessary to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples and 
expand the rights of homosexuals in general.228  While the Law-
rence majority decided the case on due process grounds,229 Jus-
  
 222. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 184. 
 223. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1.  See also United States v. Virginia, 518 
U.S. at 557; CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms), §15 and §1; See also Layland, 104 D.L.R. at 223 
(Greer, J., dissenting). 
 224. See generally Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (holding that the Colorado law 
which discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation could not survive even 
rational basis review). 
 225. Id.  
 226. See infra Part IV for a more thorough discussion.  
 227. Sanders, supra note 7, at 3C. 
 228. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (striking down a law that im-
posed criminal sanctions for engaging in sodomy).   
 229. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. The Lawrence majority relied on the Due 
Process Clause and its implicit protection of the right to privacy.  Id. (holding 
that the Texas law was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause).  The 
Court found that the consequences of the Texas law, which made it a crime for 
a person to “engage in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual or 
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tice O’Connor stated in her concurrence that she would have 
decided the case on equal protection grounds.230  While 
O’Connor’s conclusion may help the overall plight of homosexu-
als, it hampers similar progress in relation to same-sex mar-
riage because she specifically stated that in her opinion, a state 
could put forth a legitimate reason to prohibit same-sex mar-
riage.231  O’Conner stated that, under the rational basis test, the 
law in Lawrence was unconstitutional since it applied only to 
homosexuals.232  Although she noted that most laws survive un-
der the rational basis test, she stated that when the challenged 
legislation inhibits personal relationships, the Court is most 
likely to find the law unconstitutional.233  Here, she determined 
that there is no legitimate government interest in protecting 
the morals of a particular group.234  She stated that the Court 
has never held that “moral disapproval, without any other as-
serted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal 
Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among 
groups of persons.”235  Moral disapproval, she stated, like a bare 
desire to harm a group, should not satisfy the rational basis 
test.236  
However, O’Connor ended her concurrence by stating that all 
laws differentiating between heterosexuals and homosexuals 
would not automatically be considered unconstitutional.237  If 
the state puts forth a legitimate reason, the law will be up-
held.238  Under this reasoning, the state could hide its moral dis-
  
the same sex,” involved more than denying the right to engage in sexual acts, 
it also involved criminal penalties and sought to control behavior involving 
personal relationships in the privacy of one’s own home.  Id. at 567–69.  
Adults, the court said, may choose to enter into a sexual relationship in their 
own home and private lives, and still maintain their dignity and freedom: 
“The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the 
right to make this choice.”  Id. at 576. 
 230. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579–85 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (Since the 
Texas sodomy law only applied to homosexuals, O’Connor relied on the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.). 
 231. Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 580.   
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 582.  
 236. Id.   
 237. Id. at 585. 
 238. Id. 
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approval of homosexuals behind what the Court will accept as 
legitimate state interests.  One such instance, she stated, would 
be to preserve the institution of marriage.239  She did not how-
ever, provide any rationale for why the protection of marriage 
includes reserving it for couples of the opposite sex.240  
O’Connor’s reasoning is similar to the rationale used by the Ca-
nadian Supreme Court in Egan.241  In Egan, the court was will-
ing to proclaim that most laws that discriminate on the basis of 
sexual orientation are unconstitutional but, unlike the court in 
Halpern, it was unwilling to hold that a prohibition on same-sex 
marriage was unconstitutional as well.242   
IV. SEXUAL ORIENTATION SHOULD BE ELEVATED FROM A “NON-
SUSPECT” CLASS TO A “SUSPECT” CLASS 
Both the United States and Canada have constitutional 
guarantees for fundamental freedoms and equality.243  Both 
countries’ constitutions can be, and have been, used to litigate 
in the area of relationship recognition.244  As noted above, the 
litigation in Canada has fallen under Section 15(1) and Section 
1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and U.S. claims have 
been made under the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitu-
tion.     
There are notable differences between the modes of analysis 
used by Canadian courts and the U.S. courts.  Canadian courts 
have determined that a law cannot discriminate based on the 
  
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See generally Egan, 2 S.C.R. 513 (The court found that most laws that 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation are unconstitutional, however, 
the court was not willing to extend this rationale and hold that a prohibition 
on same-sex was unconstitutional.). 
 242. Id.  In O’Connor’s concurrence in Lawrence, she stated that although 
she thought the law in question was unconstitutional, she specifically declared 
that her opinion should not be extended to laws prohibiting same-sex mar-
riage. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 243. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1; See CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 
1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), §15 and §1.   
 244. Nicole LaViolette, Waiting in a New Line at City Hall: Registered Part-
nerships as an Option for Relationship Recognition Reform in Canada, 19 CAN 
J. FAM. L. 115, 161 (2002). 
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traits enumerated in Section 15(1) of the Charter,245 nor on any 
ground analogous to those listed, including sexual orientation.246   
If a law is challenged as being discriminatory under Section 
15(1) of the Charter, the court must first determine whether the 
law actually is discriminating against a particular individual or 
group of people.247  If the law is found to be discriminatory, the 
court then turns to Section 1 and determines whether the dis-
crimination imposed by the law can be justified by a legitimate 
state interest.248   Canada, unlike the United States, does not 
first determine which class the recipient of the disparate treat-
ment falls into before determining which level of scrutiny to 
apply to the law; instead, the Canadian courts afford the same 
level of review to all laws that are found to be discriminatory 
under Section 15(1).249    
Therefore, in Canada, discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion receives the same level of scrutiny as discrimination based 
on race, whereas in the United States discrimination based on 
race receives a level of scrutiny significantly higher than the 
level afforded to discrimination based on sexual orientation.250  
In the United States, the level of scrutiny will determine how 
strong the state’s interest must be in order for the state’s law to 
be upheld, whereas in Canada the state’s interest does not vary 
based upon who or what group is being discriminated against.251  
The Canadian courts have determined that barring same-sex 
couples from the institution of marriage is a violation of Section 
15(1) of the Charter since it is discriminatory and the violation 
cannot be saved under Section 1 because the legislature did not 
put forth any pressing and substantial objective for the law.252  
The Canadian analysis under Section 15(1) and Section 1 is 
most similar to the U.S. level of intermediate scrutiny.  
  
 245. CAN CONST.  (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I. (Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms), §15 (Section 15(1) lists race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.). 
 246. Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 528.  
 247. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 179. 
 248. Law, 1 S.C.R. at 529.  See discussion supra Part II. 
 249. Maxwell, supra note 184, at 159; Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 179–90. 
 250. Maxwell, supra note 184, at 159; Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 528.  
 251. Maxwell, supra note 184, at 159; Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 179–90.  
 252. See generally Halpern, 65 O.R. 3d 161 (holding that the denial of mar-
riage rights to same-sex couples violated Section 15(1) of the Charter). 
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Under the current state of the Equal Protection Clause, it 
would be harder for the U.S. Supreme Court to reach the same 
conclusion as the Halpern court did.  This is because sexual ori-
entation has been deemed a “non-suspect” class, and therefore 
only receives rational review.253  As stated earlier, under ra-
tional review it is the plaintiff who has the burden of demon-
strating that the discrimination is not “rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.”254  This is a lower standard 
than Canada’s “pressing and substantial objective” for the law.  
Typically, statutes which come under the rational basis test are 
found to be constitutional, since all the court requires to uphold 
the law is a legitimate government interest for the discrimina-
tion.255   
When a plaintiff brings a claim under the Equal Protection 
Clause stating that a law is discriminatory based on sexual ori-
entation most courts will apply rational basis review.256  How-
ever, based on the three criteria from Carolene Products Foot-
note 4 discussed in Part III, this level of review is arguably in-
correct.257  This is because gays and lesbians have suffered a his-
tory of discrimination, sexual orientation is an immutable char-
acteristic, and while it may be claimed that gays and lesbians 
  
 253. See generally Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (holding that sexual orientation 
should only receive rational basis review). 
 254. Maxwell, supra note 184, at 159. 
 255. Id. 
 256. See In re Cooper 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1993) (applying rational 
basis review in response to 14th Amendment claims challenging classifications 
based on sexual orientation); Doe v. Perry Cmty. Sch. Dist., 316 F. Supp. 2d 
809, 829–30 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (in the Eighth Circuit, discrimination based on 
sexual orientation is subject to rational basis review); Miguel v. Guess, 51 
P.3d 89, 97 n3 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that the court need not reach 
question of suspect classification based upon sexual orientation as policy in 
question violated federal Equal Protection Clause based even upon rational 
basis test), review denied by Miguel v. Guess, 2003 Wash. LEXIS 171 (Wash. 
2003);  Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp.2d 1279, 1287–89 (D. Utah 
1998) (holding that the decision not to assign a teacher to the position of vol-
leyball coach based on her sexual orientation had no rational basis and vio-
lated Equal Protection Clause); Cleaves v. City of Chicago, 21 F. Supp.2d 858, 
862 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (sexual orientation does not involve a suspect classifica-
tion or impact a fundamental interest, and thus, equal protection claims on 
this basis are examined under the rational basis test); Anderson v. Kind 
County, 2004 WL 1738447 *5 (finding homosexuals not a suspect class on 
basis that older federal cases had ruled homosexuals were not a suspect class). 
 257. See supra notes 206–10 and accompanying text. 
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are not politically powerless, other groups that have political 
power receive heightened scrutiny.258   
The first criteria under Carolene Products is that the class 
must have a demonstrated history of discrimination.259  It is ba-
sically conceded, even by opponents of elevating sexual orienta-
tion to heightened scrutiny, that homosexuals have had a his-
tory of discrimination in the United States.260   Moreover, the 
only courts that have addressed the issue agree that while ho-
mosexuals are not a suspect class, they have a history of dis-
crimination.261  The Halpern court easily made the same deter-
mination.  Citing Egan, the court stated “[T]he historic disad-
vantage suffered by homosexual persons has been widely recog-
nized and documented.”262   
While historic disadvantage remains uncontroversial, the 
second criteria from Footnote 4, immutability, has been 
strongly debated.263  Gay rights advocates say that sexual orien-
tation is a genetically influenced characteristic and not a choice 
and, therefore, is immutable.264   The Canadian Supreme Court 
agrees with this.265  In Egan, the court stated that sexual orien-
tation is “a deeply personal characteristic that is either un-
changeable or changeable only at unacceptable personal 
costs.”266 In part because of its immutability, the court in Egan 
unanimously affirmed that sexual orientation is an analogous 
ground to those enumerated in Section 15(1).267   
Opponents of granting heightened review to sexual orienta-
tion say that anti-sodomy laws single out homosexuals for vol-
untary behavior, not a common orientation.268  Most courts have 
accepted this argument:269 “[a]s the Sixth Circuit stated, ‘Those 
persons who fall within the orbit of legislation concerning sex-
ual orientation are so affected not because of their orientation 
  
 258. Drew, supra note 198, at 303; Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 528.  
 259. Drew, supra note 198, at 303.  
 260. Id.  
 261. Id.  
 262. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 184 (quoting Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 600–02).  
 263. Drew, supra note 198, at 304–05. 
 264. Drew, supra note 198, at 304. 
 265. Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 528. 
 266. Id.   
 267. Id. 
 268. Drew, supra note 198, at 304. 
 269. Id. at 305.  
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but rather by their conduct which identifies them as homosex-
ual.’”270  Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit stated that “homosexu-
ality is not an immutable characteristic; it is behavioral and 
hence is fundamentally different from traits such as race, gen-
der, or alienage, which define already existing suspect and 
quasi-suspect classes.”271   But this argument is no more than a 
semantic sleight-of-hand.  When one says that a person is “gay” 
or a “lesbian” they are not saying merely that the person en-
gages in sexual activity with others of the same sex.272  Rather, 
they are recognizing something fundamental about the person, 
which is that the person’s most intimate feelings of love and 
companionship are directed towards members of the same sex.273  
Clearly, the Canadian Supreme Court does not think that sex-
ual orientation is fundamentally different from race, gender, or 
alienage.274  In fact, when the court determined that sexual ori-
entation was analogous to those classes already listed in Sec-
tion 15(1), it gave sexual orientation the same status as race, 
gender, and alienage.275    
Political powerlessness is the third criterion from Carolene 
Products276 and, like immutability, whether homosexuals are in 
fact politically powerless has been the subject of ongoing de-
bate.277  When courts determine whether a group is politically 
powerless, they tend to consider whether the group has been 
  
 270. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 
267 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996).  See also 
Drew, supra note 198, at 304.  
 271. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573–74.  See also Darren Lenard Hutchi-
son, Discrimination and Inequality Emerging Issues “Gay Rights” for “Gay 
Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL 
L.REV. 1358, 1379 (2000).   
 272. This notion was articulated in Egan when the court stated that sexual 
orientation is “a deeply personal characteristic that is either unchangeable or 
changeable only at unacceptable personal costs.”   Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 528.  
 273. The dissenting opinion in Egan stated that “sexual orientation is more 
than simply a ‘status’ that an individual possesses: it is something that is 
demonstrated in an individual's conduct by the choice of a partner.”  Egan, 2 
S.C.R. at 601 (Cory, J. and Iacobucci, J., dissenting).   
 274. Egan, 2 S.C.R. at 528. 
 275. Id.  
 276. Drew, supra note 198, at 303.  
 277. Patrick Otto Bomberg, A Survey of Recent Cases Affecting the Rights of 
Gays, Lesbians, and Bisexuals, 3 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 392, 394 (1993).  
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able to attract the attention of lawmakers.278  In City of Cle-
burne, the Court stated that “any minority can be said to be 
powerless to assert direct control over the legislature, but if 
that were a criterion for higher level scrutiny by the courts, 
much economic and social legislation would now be suspect.”279   
This view was adopted by the Ninth Circuit when it found that 
homosexuals were not politically powerless.  It stated that “leg-
islatures have addressed and continue to address the discrimi-
nation suffered by homosexuals on account of their sexual ori-
entation through the passage of anti-discrimination legislation. 
Thus, homosexuals are not without political power; they have 
the ability to and do ‘attract the attention of the lawmakers,’ as 
evidenced by such legislation.”280    
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Romer is in line with the view that 
homosexuals are not politically powerless.281  Scalia stated  
because those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to re-
side in disproportionate numbers in certain communities, have 
high disposable income, and, of course, care about homosexual 
rights issues much more ardently than the public at large, 
they possess political power much greater than their numbers, 
both locally and statewide.  Quite understandably, they devote 
this political power to achieving not merely a grudging social 
toleration, but full social acceptance, of homosexuality.282   
Scalia, in describing gays and lesbians as wealthy and politi-
cally powerful, is asserting that he believes they are “undeserv-
ing of judicial protection.”283  But Scalia does not provide any 
support for his factual assertions.  Rather, the fact that thirty-
nine states have enacted Defense Of Marriage Acts, and only 
one state supports gay marriage (and only by virtue of a court 
  
 278. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445 (In regard to subjecting the mentally 
retarded to rational review, the court stated that this class was not politically 
powerless: “[T]he legislative response, which could hardly have occurred and 
survived without public support, negates any claim that the mentally retarded 
are politically powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the 
attention of the lawmakers.”).  
 279. Id. 
 280. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574.   
 281. Romer, 517 U.S. at 645–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 282. Id.  
 283. Hutchison, supra note 271, at 1382 (arguing that Scalia characterizes 
gay and lesbian civil rights efforts as an exertion of this disproportionate 
power).    
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decision, not legislative action) indicates that homosexuals do 
not have political clout.284  The Ninth Circuit is correct in stating 
that homosexuals do attract the attention the lawmakers, but 
this attention is to the overwhelming detriment of gays and les-
bians.  
Moreover, the argument that heightened scrutiny depends in 
part on whether a group is politically powerless no longer holds 
water.  Gender discrimination or, rather, laws that discriminate 
against women, receive heightened scrutiny; however, it is no 
longer plausible to say that women are a politically powerless 
group.  Currently, women occupy fourteen seats in the Senate 
and sixty-eight seats in the House of Representatives.285  In his 
dissent in United States v. Virginia, Scalia argued that women 
are not politically powerless.286  He stated “it is hard to consider 
women a ‘discrete and insular minority’ unable to employ the 
‘political process ordinarily to be relied upon,’ when they consti-
tute a majority of the electorate….  Moreover, a long list of leg-
islation proves the proposition false.”287   The court in Halpern 
did not even examine whether homosexuals were politically 
powerless, presumably because it is irrelevant.  Presumably 
  
 284. DOMA Watch, available at http://www.domawatch.org/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2005).  The eleven states that do not have junior DOMA’s are 
the following: Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming.  Peterson, supra note 8.  But it should be noted that in New Hamp-
shire and Wyoming there is a state law that bans same-sex marriage and pre-
dates DOMA laws; and in Wisconsin there has been a state Supreme Court 
ruling stating that only heterosexual marriages are legal. Id.  See generally 
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941 (holding that the prohibition on same-sex mar-
riage violated the Massachusetts constitution).  
 285. Guide to the New Congress, available at http://oncongress.cq.com/ 
corp/flatfiles/editorialFiles/temporaryItems/mon20041103-3demographics.pdf.  
(last visited Jan. 29, 2005). 
 286. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 287. Id. at 575–76.  The legislation Scalia spoke of includes the Equal Pay 
Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Title IX of the Education Amendments, 
the Women’s Business Ownership Act, and the Violence Against Women Act. 
See Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1993); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964);  Title IX of the Education Amendments, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1681 (1972); Women’s Business Ownership Act, Pub. L. No. 100-533, 102 
Stat. 2689 (1988); Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 107-249, 
108 Stat. 1902.  The U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Morrison held that the 
Violence Against Women Act was unconstitutional.  U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598 (2000).  
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Canada has anti-discrimination laws much like the United 
States, but the Canadian courts do not use these laws against 
those claiming discrimination. 
We see that sexual orientation meets the first two criteria for 
heightened scrutiny and, arguably, the third test (if it is neces-
sary to apply it) as well.  In fact, there have been some state 
courts that have granted sexual orientation the heightened 
level of scrutiny it deserves.288  The Court of Appeals of Oregon 
had “no difficulty” concluding that sexual orientation is a sus-
pect class and stated that “sexual orientation, like gender, race, 
alienage, and religious affiliation is widely regarded as defining 
a distinct, socially recognized group of citizens, and certainly it 
is beyond dispute that homosexuals in our society have been 
and continue to be the subject of adverse social and political 
stereotyping and prejudice.” 289 
If sexual orientation is granted heightened scrutiny, as it 
should be, then it would be nearly impossible for a law prohibit-
ing same-sex marriage to survive.  Under the heightened scru-
tiny test, the state must show that “the legislative use of the 
classification ‘reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the 
ideal of equal protection that furthers a substantial interest of 
the state’”290 and the party seeking to defend the law must show 
an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the law.291   The 
standard for the Canadian courts is virtually the same, which is 
that the law must be pressing and substantial and the means 
chosen to achieve the objective are reasonably and demonstra-
bly justifiable in a free and democratic society.292  Applying the 
Canadian courts standard to the case before it, the Halpern 
court’s analysis led it to its holding that there was no “pressing 
and substantial” legislative reason for justifying the discrimina-
  
 288. See generally Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999) (dismissing 
case in which same-sex couples sought to be married based on intervening 
amendment to the state constitution, but noting that sexual orientation con-
stitutes a suspect classification and therefore would be subject to heightened 
scrutiny); Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 524 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1998) (same-sex couples constitute a suspect class for purposes of consti-
tutional discrimination analysis).  
 289. Tanner, 971 P.2d 524 (The court did not discuss the politically power-
lessness of homosexuals.). 
 290. Maxwell, supra note 184, at 159–60. 
 291. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531. 
 292. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 191.  
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tory law.  Using the same analysis and applying it to the U.S. 
standard of heightened scrutiny, the U.S. courts should come to 
the same conclusion as the Canadian courts.    
V. UNDER CURRENT UNITED STATES JURISPRUDENCE, THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT SHOULD REACH THE SAME CONCLUSION AS 
HALPERN  
While the U.S. Supreme Court should give sexual orientation 
heightened scrutiny, even under a rational review standard the 
Court should conclude that a ban on same-sex marriage is un-
constitutional.  Although Halpern’s analysis is most similar to 
intermediate scrutiny, the court's analysis of the arguments 
given by the Attorney General would yield the same result un-
der a rational basis review standard.   Support for this conclu-
sion is found in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, in 
which the Massachusetts Supreme Court applied a rational re-
view standard to the arguments advanced by the Massachusetts 
Attorney General in support of denying the right to marry to 
same-sex couples.293   In Goodridge, the court held that a prohi-
bition on same-sex marriage failed the rational review test, and 
was therefore unconstitutional under Massachusetts law. 294   
In Goodridge, the state proposed three reasons to justify the 
refusal to allow same-sex marriages:295 (1) the traditional notion 
that marriage’s primary purpose is procreation; (2) opposite-sex 
marriage ensures that children are raised in the optimal set-
  
 293. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961.  The Massachusetts courts use the same 
language as the Supreme Court of the United States for rational review: “[a] 
regulatory authority must, at the very least, serve ‘a legitimate purpose in a 
rational way’; a statute must ‘bear a reasonable relation to a permissible legis-
lative objective.’” Id. at 960-61.  In Goodridge the court stated that since the 
statute did not survive rational basis review it did not need to consider 
whether sexual orientation was entitled to heightened scrutiny. Id. at 961. 
 294. Mark E. Wojcik, The Wedding Bells Heard Around the World: Years 
From Now, Will We Wonder Why We Worried About Same-Sex Marriage?, 24 
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 589, 657 (2004)  (“The court found that the exclusion of mar-
riage for same-sex couples failed to pass the rational basis test for both Due 
Process and Equal Protection.  The decision was hailed as the wedding bell 
that might be heard around the world.”).  
 295. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960–61. 
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ting; and 3) desire to conserve scarce state and private financial 
resources.296     
The first argument was rejected for the same reasons the ar-
gument was rejected in Halpern.  The court found that procrea-
tion is not a condition of marriage; instead it said that the es-
sence of marriage is a mutual commitment.297  Furthermore, the 
court stated that marriage should not remain a heterosexual 
union merely because historically it has only been a heterosex-
ual union.298  The Halpern court rejected the same argument 
made by the Attorney General.299  In Halpern, the Attorney 
General wanted to preserve the institution of marriage as het-
erosexual because it had always been that way.300  In response, 
the court stated that “stating that marriage is heterosexual be-
cause it has always been heterosexual is merely an explanation 
for the opposite-sex requirement of marriage; it is not an objec-
tive that is capable of justifying the infringement of a Charter 
guarantee.”301  As for the second argument, the court held that 
while protecting children is a legitimate state policy, denying 
same-sex marriage will not achieve that policy because the best 
interest of a child does not depend on a parent’s sexual orienta-
tion.302   The court found there was “no rational relationship be-
tween the marriage statute and the Commonwealth’s proffered 
goal of protecting the ‘optimal’ child rearing unit.”303    
Under the third rationale, the state argued that same-sex 
couples are more financially independent than married couples 
and less reliant on public resources.304  The court rejected this 
argument, stating that the “absolute statutory ban on same-sex 
  
 296. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960. See also Wojcik, supra note 294, at 663–
67.  Other arguments, which were not as strong as these three, were put forth 
by the state and were subsequently rejected by the court.  Goodridge, 798 
N.E.2d at 965–69. 
 297. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961. See also Wojcik, supra note 294, at 664.    
 298. Id. at 332.  
 299. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 190. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id.  
 302. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961–63.  “The demographic changes of the 
past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family.  The 
composition of families varies greatly from household to household.”  Id. at 
963.    
 303. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 963. 
 304. Id. 
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marriage bears no rational relationship to the goal of econ-
omy.”305   The Halpern court rejected a similar argument finding 
that because both same-sex and opposite-sex couples raise chil-
dren, the argument that only opposite-sex couples should re-
ceive an economic benefit from the state is not viable.306   
There were other arguments advanced by the state and sub-
sequently rejected by the court.307  While they were not as strong 
as the first three, one of them is worthy of note.  The Common-
wealth argued that same-sex marriage would “trivialize or de-
stroy the institution of marriage as it has historically been fash-
ioned.”308 The court rejected this argument, stating that same-
sex couples did not want to abolish the institution of marriage, 
but wanted access to it.309  The rejection of this argument by the 
court echoes Halpern, which stated that “it is not disputed that 
marriage has been a stabilizing and effective societal institu-
tion.  The Couples (same-sex couples) are not seeking to abolish 
the institution of marriage; they are seeking access to it.”310  
Not only did the Goodridge court reach the same conclusion 
as Halpern under a rational review test, but it also cited 
Halpern when it determined the proper remedy to apply.  The 
Goodridge court found that Canada’s new definition of mar-
riage, being “the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to 
the exclusion of all others,” should also be Massachusetts’ new 
definition of marriage.311  The Massachusetts court made a pow-
erful statement by declaring that even under a rational basis 
review, a prohibition on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional.  
However, since the Massachusetts court did not discuss 
whether a prohibition on same-sex marriage violated the U.S. 
Constitution, and because this case was decided completely as a 
violation of the state constitution,312 it remains to be seen 
  
 305. Id.  
 306. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 188.  
 307. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 963–65. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 194. 
 311. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 197. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969. 
 312. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958. 
The Massachusetts Constitution protects matters of personal liberty 
against government incursion as zealously, and often more so, than 
does the Federal Constitution, even where both Constitutions employ 
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whether the U.S. Supreme Court would reach the same conclu-
sions based on a rational level of review.  However, as demon-
strated by both Halpern and Goodridge, there is no rational 
reason for the prohibition on same-sex marriage.   
After examining the arguments in these cases it seems clear 
that the only remaining argument for banning same-sex mar-
riage is that marriage traditionally has been only between op-
posite-sex couples.  But as Halpern and Goodridge stated, argu-
ing that marriage should be heterosexual because it has always 
been that way is not a sufficient reason for discriminating 
against a certain group of people.313   Moreover, the argument 
that our society should continue to do something because it is 
the way it has traditionally been done is not a sufficient ground 
for upholding a discriminatory practice.  If tradition were per-
mitted to be a rationale for upholding a discriminatory law, 
then different races would not be permitted to marry,314 women 
  
essentially the same language.  That the Massachusetts Constitution 
is in some instances more protective of individual liberty interests 
than is the Federal Constitution is not surprising.  Fundamental to 
the vigor of our Federal system of government is that ‘state courts are 
absolutely free to interpret state constitutional provisions to accord 
greater protection to individual rights than do similar provisions of 
the United States Constitution.  
Id. at 959 (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995)). 
 313. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 192. 
 314. For a more thorough discussion, see RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL 
INTIMACIES (2003) (describing and assessing the beliefs, customs, laws, and 
institutions of interracial relationships). 
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would be considered the property of their husbands,315 and slav-
ery would still exist.316     
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Once it is established that a statute discriminates against a 
recognized class, the Canadian courts determine the constitu-
tionality of the statute by analyzing whether the purpose of the 
statute is pressing and substantial and whether the means cho-
sen to achieve the objective are reasonably and demonstrably 
justifiable in a free and democratic society.317   The U.S. courts 
should use the same analysis under the heightened scrutiny 
test, although under the current state of the law the U.S. courts 
would use the rational review test.  Regardless of the test used 
by U.S. courts, as Halpern and Goodridge demonstrate, the ar-
guments made to justify prohibitions on same-sex marriage, 
including that the purpose of marriage is to unite the opposite 
sexes, encourage procreation, and companionship, are insuffi-
cient to support a continued ban on same-sex unions.318   
Whether sexual orientation is granted the heightened scru-
tiny it deserves or the courts choose to continue to use rational 
review, there is no constitutional basis for denying same-sex 
couples the same right to marry enjoyed by heterosexual cou-
ples.  Many people in both the United States and Canada hold 
strong religious and moral views against same-sex marriages 
  
 315. For a more thorough discussion, see ALVAH L. STINSON, WOMEN UNDER 
THE LAW (1914) (discusses the rights, privileges, and disabilities of women 
under the law at the turn of the 20th century).   See also Michael L. Rustad & 
Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice Sys-
tem as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 20 (2002) (“At 
common law, women were classified as personal property of the male head of 
household.”); Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, A More Perfect Union: A 
Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1164, n.102 (1992) (“At common law, the husband had extensive rights in 
his wife’s property, and she lacked the power to contract or engage in litiga-
tion except through her husband.”); Sandra L. Rierson, Race and Gender Dis-
crimination: A Historical Case For Equal TreatmentUnder the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 89, 89–94 (1994).   
 316. For a more thorough discussion, see ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE 
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM (2004) (discussing the his-
tory and ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment and the concept of free-
dom). 
 317. Halpern, 65 O.R.3d at 191.  
 318. Id. at 188–94. 
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and homosexuality, based on their personal religious beliefs and 
views of morality.319   However, as a legal matter, these beliefs 
and views do not determine whether a law is unconstitutionally 
discriminatory. 320   As stated by the court in Goodridge,  
Many people hold deep-seated religious, moral, and ethical 
convictions that marriage should be limited to the union of one 
man and one woman, and that homosexual conduct is im-
moral.  Many hold equally strong religious, moral, and ethical 
convictions that same-sex couples are entitled to be married, 
and that homosexual persons should be treated no differently 
than their heterosexual neighbors.  Neither view answers the 
question before us.  Our concern is with the Massachusetts 
Constitution as a charter of governance for every person prop-
erly within its reach.  “Our obligation is to define the liberty of 
all, not to mandate our own moral code.”321  
Both Canadian and U.S. courts have found that “tradition” is 
not a sufficient constitutional justification for discrimination.  
  
 319. See e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948; Brenda Feigen, Same-Sex Mar-
riage: An Issue of Constitutional Rights Not Moral Opinion, 27 HARV. 
WOMEN'S L.J. 345, 354–55 (2004); Gary Chamberlain, Same-Sex Marriage: A 
Religious Argument for Same-Sex Marriage, 2 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 495 
(2004); Religious Tolerance.Org, available at http://www.religioustolerance. 
org/hom_marb.htm.  
 320. Justice Scalia, however, does believe that morality can and even should 
influence the court.  In his dissent in Romer, he stated that he believed that 
the Colorado legislature was not hiding behind a “bare desire to harm” homo-
sexuals, but preserving what it determined to be traditional sexual mores.  
Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The State, he believes, is enti-
tled to make this determination.  Id. Under Scalia’s interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause, a state legislature would be permitted to determine 
that a particular practice, even if based on race, is morally unacceptable, and 
thus, is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  With Scalia’s analysis 
of the Equal Protection Clause, states could still have anti-miscegenation 
laws.  If Scalia’s reasoning is followed to its logical conclusion, then even un-
der the strict scrutiny test, a law supporting segregation could be upheld if it 
were based on traditional customs, which at one point in our country’s history 
there were.  Scalia seems to be saying that as long as a law is in accord with 
the majority of society’s view of morality, it will be constitutional.    
  Justice Stevens, however, stated in his dissent in Bowers that “the fact 
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular 
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting 
the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting misce-
genation from constitutional attack.”  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 321. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948 (quoting Lawrence 539 U.S. at 571). 
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As stated by Lord Sankey in Edwards v. A.G. Canada, “[t]he 
British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree ca-
pable of growth and expansion within its natural limits.”322  This 
“living tree” is the Canadian Constitution and as Halpern aptly 
stated, 
The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different 
from that of construing a statute. A statute defines present 
rights and obligations. It is easily enacted and as easily re-
pealed. A constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an eye to 
the future. Its function is to provide a continuing framework 
for the legitimate exercise of governmental power and, when 
joined by a Bill or a Charter of Rights, for the unremitting pro-
tection of individual rights and liberties. Once enacted, its 
provisions cannot easily be repealed or amended. It must, 
therefore, be capable of growth and development over time to 
meet new social, political and historical realities often unimag-
ined by its framers. The judiciary is the guardian of the consti-
tution and must, in interpreting its provisions, bear these con-
siderations in mind.323 
The U.S. courts have utilized a similar approach.  As stated 
in United States v. Virginia, “[a] prime part of the history of our 
constitution is the story of the extension of constitutional rights 
and protections to people once ignored or excluded.”324   The U.S. 
courts should not permit “tradition” any more than personal 
religious beliefs or views of morality to substitute for the kind of 
legal and logical analyses used by the courts in Halpern and 
Goodridge.  Those courts’ analyses show that prohibitions on 
same-sex marriage cannot withstand heightened scrutiny or 
  
 322. Halpern, 65 O.R. 3d at 175 (quoting Edwards v. A.G. Canada, [1930] 
A.C. 124). 
 323. Halpern, 65 O.R. 3d at 175 (quoting Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 
S.C.R. 145, 155). 
 324. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 557. 
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rational review, and should be held to be unconstitutional un-
der the U.S. Constitution, as they were under the Canadian 
Charter.  
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